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Abstract: This article evaluates the contemporary discursive status of victims and people 
convicted of criminal offences.  The rhetoric used by British politicians to convey the meaning 
of ‘rights’ is explored within media output, parliamentary speech-making and other forms of 
political discourse.  Our analysis details how victims’ rights are sometimes advocated for at 
the expense of ‘offenders’’ rights in public discourse.  Examination of parliamentary debates 
illustrates that differentiating between ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ elides consideration of more 
meaningful support for victims, worsens opportunities for the reintegration of ex-prisoners 
and constructs a false dichotomy between citizens who do not fall into mutually-exclusive 
categories.  
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The Prime Minister: It makes me physically ill even to contemplate having to give the vote to 
anyone who is in prison. Frankly, when people commit a crime and go to prison, they should 
lose their rights, including the right to vote. (Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 516, col. 921, 3 
November 2010) 
 
The above quotation from David Cameron exemplifies the willingness of some politicians to 
engage in populist posturing through the rhetorical denial of basic rights of citizenship for an 
unpopular minority – in this case, voting rights to prisoners.  This extraordinary statement 
might be viewed as an example of Bottoms’s (1995) notion of ‘populist punitiveness’ which 
conveys ‘the notion of politicians tapping into, and using for their purposes, what they believe 
to be the public's generally punitive stance' (p.40).  In the wake of rising prisoner numbers 
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and an apparent shift towards increased political concern with ‘public opinion’ and victims of 
crime (Drake 2012), there has been sustained criminological focus on punitive discourses and 
the implementation of harsher criminal justice policies (Garland 2001; Pratt et al. 2005; 
Zimring and Johnson 2006).  This enactment of what Snacken (2010) calls a ‘populist’ form 
of democracy utilises a political approach that places much emphasis on the perceived will of 
the majority at the expense of the interests of unpopular, and less powerful, minority groups 
or those who have been labelled as ‘other’.   
Within this context, debates associated with human and civil rights often seem to 
descend into a zero-sum game where victims’ rights are seemingly only won at the expense of 
the rights of accused persons or prisoners (Williams 2005; Hall 2009). This binary positioning 
of perpetrators or prisoners versus victims is a powerful ideological move.  It casts victims, 
and those accused or convicted of criminal conduct, as distinct, polarised opposites (Zedner 
2004; Dignan 2005; Bednarova 2011).  Further, by politicising the issue of victims’ versus 
‘offenders’’ rights a clear delineation is drawn between those who are ‘deserving’ of legal 
protections and those who are not.  Such delineations encourage narratives which construct 
the ‘criminal’ or the ‘prisoner’ as having actively forfeited their rights and are in keeping with 
discourses that define lawbreakers as ‘other’ (Drake 2012).  Whilst such crude binary 
constructions have often appeared in media discourses in the wake of particularly violent or 
high-profile crimes, there has been an apparent increasing reliance on a zero-sum approach to 
victims’ and offenders’ rights in political rhetoric in Britain since the early 1990s (Sanders 
2002).    
The way discourse is used to construct ideas about social deviance, crime and 
‘offenders’ has been an area of sustained criminological attention (Walker and Boyeskie 
2001).  Cohen’s (2002) work on constructions of young people as ‘folk devils’ and the 
emergence of ‘moral panics’ has framed much critical analysis aimed at examining 
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constructions of deviance and dangerousness.  Recent research in this area focuses more 
intently on the role of tabloid newspapers (and even fictional accounts of imprisonment) in 
the shaping of public attitudes towards the ‘criminal’ and the supposed ‘soft’ conditions of 
imprisonment in the UK (Mason 2007; Cheliotis 2010).  Media coverage on political thinking 
concerning crime and justice conveys increased political concern with ‘public acceptability’ 
regarding prison conditions and regimes.  For instance, in 2009 it was reported that HM 
Prison Service had:  
 
… warned governors to ensure all activities are ‘acceptable, purposeful and meet the public 
acceptability test’ … governors have been told they must consider how activities ‘might be 
perceived by the public and victims’ and avoid ‘indefensible criticism’ that undermine public 
confidence in the Prison Service. (Independent on Sunday, 25 January 2009)  
 
This media account followed a direct order from the then Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, who, 
it was claimed, was embarrassed by tabloid reports of a stand-up comedy class being run in a 
high-security prison.  More recently, David Cameron, in a speech announcing details of his 
government’s ‘rehabilitation revolution’ has asserted the need for a criminal justice policy 
which is ‘tough but intelligent’ (tellingly he used the words ‘tough’, ‘toughen’ or ‘tougher’ 24 
times in the speech and ‘rehabilitate’ only seven) (UK Government 2012). Meanwhile, 
Cameron’s Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, has announced a range of reforms to prison 
conditions which will include banning 18 certificate DVDs, making new prisoners wear a 
uniform for the first two weeks of their sentence and making access to prison gymnasia 
contingent on engagement with work and rehabilitation programmes (BBC News, 30 April 
2013).  
This article contributes to these debates by undertaking a selective, but critical, 
analysis of British political discourse on issues associated with the rights of lawbreakers and 
victims of crime.  It focuses on the ways in which lawbreakers come to be seen as ‘other’, 
arguing that violent and high-profile crimes and criminals are often the basis on which such 
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constructions are formed (Drake 2011, 2012).  It is shown that political and media discourses 
also frequently refer to ‘offenders’: a homogenous label which implicitly constructs as ‘other’ 
anyone who is known to have contravened the law and served a prison or other court-
prescribed sentence.  We argue that the label ‘offender’ and the associated processes of 
‘othering’ set up a false dichotomy between citizens, based upon the idea that experiences of 
victimisation and offending are mutually-exclusive phenomena.  Furthermore, by examining 
the rhetoric of parliamentary speech-making, media output and other forms of public 
discourse, we demonstrate the ways in which victims’ rights and ‘offenders’’ rights are 
dichotomised.  This, we suggest, effectively creates two distinct categories – ‘law-abiding 
citizens’ who are deserving of rights and State protections and ‘law-breaking denizens’ who, 
by virtue of their ‘outsider’ status and criminal records, are marginalised and cast into the 
emerging global precariat (see Standing 2011).  We conclude that these tactics have longer-
term implications for the social reintegration of those who have contravened the law and 
prevent the emergence of more meaningful and productive strategies for supporting victims.  
 
‘Victims’, ‘Offenders’ and Divisive Discourse 
 
The construction of all lawbreakers as ‘offenders’ can be seen as problematic when 
considered alongside the following information regarding the launch of the Police National 
Database in 2011 by the National Policing Improvement Agency:  
 
The Police National Database (PND) will be used by a total of 53 police bodies in England, 
Wales, Scotland and the British Transport Police. Up to 15 million people's details are 
estimated to appear on the database … Around 9.2 million people on the database will have 
criminal records, with others there for more minor offences or because they have been 
brought to police attention. (Computer Weekly, 22 June 2011) 
 
 
Within this context, rhetorical appeals to the collective sentiments of a ‘law-abiding majority’ 
become difficult to justify, since the data refer only to those 9.2 million actually convicted of 
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criminal offences.  The ‘dark figure of crime’ and the problem of unreported criminal activity 
has been an issue that has long bedevilled those who attempt to quantify crime patterns 
(Coleman and Moynihan 1996).  Thus, it might be argued that many millions more have 
committed criminal offences which have remained undetected and unprosecuted.  
Furthermore, the idea that perpetrators and victims of crime are always mutually-exclusive 
categories is a false assumption since there is often overlap between the demographic profiles 
of those who are statistically more likely to be at risk of crime victimisation (Chaplin, Flatley 
and Smith 2011) and those who may be at risk of involvement in criminal activity (Webster, 
MacDonald and Simpson 2006).  Karstedt and Farrall (2006) have also discussed ‘the crimes 
of everyday life’, those offences which: 
are committed by those who think of themselves as respectable citizens, and who would 
definitely reject the labels of ‘criminals’ and ‘crime’ for themselves and their actions. 
Politicians refer to them as the ‘law-abiding majority in this country’, ignoring the fact that 
the majority does not abide by the law, or at least is highly selective in when to comply and 
when not to. (p.1011, italics in original) 
 
Dividing ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ into distinct groups in the public imaginary might be 
considered as an outcome of cultural representations of crime and justice.  The murder of 
two-year-old James Bulger in 1993 by two ten-year-old boys is often cited as a watershed 
case in media coverage (see Green 2008), which provided a significant opportunity for the 
ruling Conservative government to assert a populist position as the party for law and order. 
Only a few days after James Bulger’s body was discovered, Prime Minister John Major 
asserted his tough stance on crime in a newspaper interview and drove a clear wedge between 
victims and ‘offenders’ by saying: ‘I would like the public to have a crusade against crime 
and change from being forgiving of crime to being considerate to the victim. Society needs to 
condemn a little more and understand a little less’ (Mail On Sunday, 21 February 1993).  
Haydon and Scraton (2000) examine the shift in political and public discourse on crime 
following the Bulger murder as part of a wider consideration of the rights’ implications of this 
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case for the youth justice system.  They conclude that the case had at least three significant 
consequences for the future of criminal justice policy in the UK: 
 
First, it initiated a reconsideration of the social construction of ten-year-olds as ‘demons’ 
rather than ‘innocents’.  Second, it coalesced with, and helped to mobilize, a moral panic 
about youth crime in general.  Third, it legitimated a series of tough law-and-order responses 
which came to characterize much of the 1990s. (p.447) 
 
The period following the Bulger case is often linked with the emergence of an almost 
hegemonic centre-right political consensus on issues of criminal justice (Downes 1998; 
Downes and Morgan 2002).  Whilst Tory Home Secretary Michael Howard was advocating 
the use of incarceration on the basis that ‘prison works’, the Labour Party, desperate to shed 
its perceived image as being ‘soft on crime’, was reborn under Tony Blair as New Labour – a 
party which promised not only to be ‘tough on crime’ but also ‘tough on the causes of crime’ 
(Sim 2009).  Consequently, the political landscape in Britain shifted toward a more populist 
form of democracy that has laid the foundations on which clearer and deeper divisions have 
been drawn between victims and lawbreakers.  Under the New Labour government, which 
was eminently concerned with projecting its new ‘tough on crime’ image in both the media 
and the court of public opinion, discourses emerged which drew dividing lines between the 
victims of crime (deserving of sympathy and compassion) and ‘offenders’ (in need of ‘tough’ 
responses).  As Garland (2001) has commented: 
 
The penal-welfare approach proceeded as if the interests of society and the interests of the 
offender could be made to coincide.  Rehabilitating offenders, reforming prisons, dealing with 
the root causes of crime – these were in the interests of everyone.  Money spent on treating 
the offender and improving social conditions would be repaid by falling rates of crime and a 
better-integrated citizenry.  The treatment of offenders was a positive sum game.  Today the 
interests of convicted offenders, insofar as they are considered at all, are viewed as 
fundamentally opposed to those of the public … In consequence, and without much 
discussion, the interests of the offender and even his or her legal rights, are routinely 
disregarded. (p.180) 
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In July 2006, the government published a discussion document entitled Rebalancing the 
Criminal Justice System in Favour of the Law-abiding Majority.  This report included a 
foreword by Tony Blair which expressed concern that: ‘The public believe that the system 
shows more concern for protecting the rights of those who break or ignore the law than those 
who keep it’ (Home Office 2006, p.2).  However, the report provided little evidence of the 
validity of this premise or how it had been established.  As Loader (2006) argued, there was 
no clear argument presented as to what constituted the imbalance or on what grounds it was 
being claimed that the public perceived there to be an imbalance.  In his response to the 
discussion document he stated:  
 
I simply think you need to offer more serious evidence than any I have seen that this 
[imbalance] is in fact the case, rather than simply assert that it is so, or that ‘the public’ 
believes it to be so … The idea of balance almost always functions in these discussions as a 
piece of rhetorical trickery … It offers no criteria whatsoever for determining what the right 
‘balance’ looks like, sets up the whole debate as an entirely zero-sum game between 
‘criminals’ and ‘victims’, and offers no resources for protecting the criminal justice system 
from utilitarian calculation. (Loader 2006) 
 
More recently, the role of ‘Victims’ Commissioner’ has been established ‘to listen to the 
views of victims and witnesses, understand the criminal justice system from their point of 
view and try to help improve the services and support available’ (Ministry of Justice 2012). 
This long-overdue arrangement provides some response to continued criticism that the 
criminal justice system has historically failed victims (Dignan 2005).  Indeed, greater victim 
involvement in the administration of criminal justice has been seen by many victims’ rights’ 
groups as a positive (if still tokenistic) development (Walklate 2007). Yet, whilst there may 
be some satisfaction on the part of victims’ rights’ campaigners and segments of the general 
population when attempts to alter foregoing criminal justice processes are successful, such 
measures do not tend to result in a more meaningful recognition of the loss experienced by 
victims of serious crime.   The role of victims within criminal justice policy formation is often 
more symbolic and rhetorical than meaningful (Bottoms 1983; Karmen 1992; Walklate 
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2007).  Sim (2009, p.158) argues that surveys reveal that victims can be sceptical of the 
capacity of the prison and punitive measures to solve problems of crime.  Yet these voices 
have generally been ignored, with political rhetoric and crime policy in Britain gravitating 
toward those voices calling for a more retributive response.   
In marked contrast to the growing sensitivity accorded to crime victims, lawbreakers 
are increasingly the targets of vilification in political discourse.  The government response to 
the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (Ministry of Justice 2010, 2011) – purportedly the 
blueprint for a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ – pledged commitments to the rights and needs of 
victims within the context of an expressly punitive language about the purposes of the 
criminal justice system.  A quotation attributed to Chris Grayling’s predecessor, Kenneth 
Clarke, at the beginning of the response states: ‘A firm, fair justice system which keeps the 
law-abiding safe and gives law-breakers their just deserts is the most fundamental thing a 
state should offer its citizens’ (Ministry of Justice 2011, p.1).  This rhetoric presents an image 
of a ‘powerful state’ that is cast as the protector of the rights of ‘good citizens’, guaranteeing 
serious consequences for those who contravene the law.  Against this backdrop, the 
withholding or curtailment of ‘offenders’’ rights may be seen as holding symbolic purchase in 
reinforcing political legitimacy through promises of public safety.  Drawing discursive 
connections between safety, ‘good’ citizenry, and the powerful State suggests a rationale for 
disregarding the citizenship and rights of lawbreakers who are, presumably, not offered those 
most ‘fundamental protections’ extended to the ‘law-abiding public’.   
These discourses and ways of thinking about the problems of crime produce and 
reproduce constructions of both victims and ‘offenders’ that are simplistic and one-
dimensional.  Such constructions are instrumental in reinforcing existing fears and dominant 
beliefs about the problem of crime and about how those who break certain laws ‘ought’ to be 
treated. Furthermore, they draw clear delineations between the ‘law-abiding’ and the 
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‘dangerous’ and between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’.  Within this policy context, 
‘offenders’ are often crudely cast as undeserving of citizenship rights and State protections.  
Easton (2009, 2011) has persuasively argued the importance of the prisoner’s right to vote 
and how the act of voting is a means of reaffirming the social contract.  She argues:   
For the offender, voting is, in some respects, even more important than for the ordinary 
citizen, because it is a reminder of one’s duties under the social contract.  It also reinforces a 
core value of democracy, namely equality. But denial of voting rights undermines civic 
respect and respect for the rule of law and thereby erodes the process of prisoner 
rehabilitation, which should include an understanding of the obligations and burdens of 
citizenship. (Easton 2009, p.232)   
 
Instead, the current policy of denying prisoners the right to vote casts them apart from other 
citizens.  Standing (2011) deploys the term ‘denizens’ to describe those members of society 
who do not possess the full range of entitlements that citizens do (that is, civil, social, 
political, economic and cultural rights): 
 
The idea of the denizen, which can be traced back to Roman times, has usually been applied 
to foreigners given residency rights and rights to ply their trade, but not full citizenship rights 
… In the wider world, most denizens are migrants … However, one other category stands out 
– the large layer of people who have been criminalised, the convicted.  The globalisation era 
has seen a growth in the number of actions deemed to be criminal.  More people are arrested 
and more are incarcerated than ever before, resulting in more people being criminalised than 
ever before. (Standing 2011, p.14) 
 
Issues of rights and citizenship (or denizenship) are, therefore, inextricably linked with issues 
of criminal justice. It is to the debates surrounding political rights for prisoners that we now 
turn. 
 
Votes for Prisoners: A ‘Slap in the Face’ for Victims? 
 
The issue of citizenship rights and, in particular, the extension of the vote to prisoners in 
Britain has received much parliamentary and media attention.  The UK’s disenfranchisement 
of convicted prisoners dates back to the Forfeiture Act of 1870 which enshrined in law the 
concept of ‘civic death’.  This was further clarified by Section 3 of the Representation of the 
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People Act 1983.  Following a successful action taken to the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2005, the judgment in Hirst v. the United Kingdom [No. 2] (74025/01 [2005] 
ECHR 681) ruled that if the franchise was to be removed from convicted prisoners, then the 
measure needed to be compatible with Article 3 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which commits the UK to free and fair elections.  The 
Hirst ruling, therefore, called on the UK to justify its departure from the principle of universal 
suffrage and effectively made the blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting unlawful (van 
Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009).  Following prompts from the Committee of Ministers in the 
Council of Europe, the UK government announced proposals in December 2010 (UK 
Government 2010) as to how the Hirst v. UK [No. 2] ruling might be implemented.  The 
proposals, for the first time, indicated a differentiation between certain groups of prisoners, 
suggesting that those serving determinate sentences of less than four years might be given the 
franchise.   
Media coverage of these debates, however, drew on aspects of the debate which 
reinforced constructions of all prisoners as equally undeserving of rights.  For example, 
shadow Justice Secretary, Sadiq Khan, was reported to have quickly positioned victims of 
crime as central to his opposition to the proposals, describing prisoners’ voting rights, as a 
‘slap in the face for victims of crime’ (Sky News, 5 January 2011). Continuing this theme, he 
was also reported as stating that: ‘The Government should be standing up for the victims of 
crime but instead they are slashing police numbers and giving dangerous convicted prisoners 
the vote’ (Daily Telegraph, 20 January 2011).  His stance on this issue was, perhaps, 
somewhat incongruous with his former role, not only as a leading human rights’ solicitor, but 
also as a former chair of civil liberties pressure group, Liberty.  Furthermore, his position 
ignored the fact that the issue was only now up for discussion due to the inaction of the 
previous Labour government in which he had served. Thus, there has been a general scarcity 
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in both media coverage and political debate, of voices on either the left or the right supporting 
votes for prisoners. A cross-bench alliance was later formed between Labour’s Jack Straw 
(the former Justice Secretary who had failed to implement the Hirst v. UK ruling) and 
Conservative MP, David Davis, who together secured a parliamentary debate on the issue.  
Revealingly, Davis was reported to have claimed at the time that: ‘I yield to no-one in my 
defence of human rights, but giving rapists the vote is not human rights’ (BBC News, 18 
January 2011). 
The parliamentary debate took place on 10 February 2010 and the subsequent vote in 
favour of maintaining the voting ban for convicted prisoners was won overwhelmingly by 
234 votes to 22 (although this turnout represented less than half of the total number of MPs).   
A number of speakers, on both sides of the House, explicitly discussed victims of crime 
within their speeches, initially dismissing the idea of prisoner voting on the basis that it may 
cause offence to victims: 
 
although we do not get a lot of letters from prisoners demanding the vote, we will get a heck 
of a lot of letters from victims and their families if we give those people the vote? (Ian 
Paisley, Democratic Unionist Party: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, col. 519, 10 February 
2011) 
 
Later contributions saw the re-emergence of the familiar theme which prompted the 
‘rebalancing the system’ debates of 2006 and the idea of a criminal justice system which 
‘favoured’ offenders over victims: 
 
So often we hear our constituents complain that the legal system is on the side of the offender 
rather than the victim. (Tom Harris, Labour: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, col. 548, 10 
February 2011) 
 
some people are keener to promote the rights of perpetrators of crime than those of victims of 
crime. (Matthew Offord, Conservative: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, col. 575, 10 February 
2011) 
 
I find it extraordinary that we are talking about the rights of convicted criminals – people in 
prison – rather than the rights of those who are the victims … the rights of criminals, as 
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opposed to the rights of victims, are constantly discussed and put first. (Priti Patel, 
Conservative: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, cols 575–6, 10 February 2011) 
 
Amidst the debate there were very few voices in favour of recognising the rights of prisoners 
to vote.  One speaker raised opposition to prisoner disenfranchisement and presented the 
viewpoint that there is no clear benefit to victims by denying citizenship rights to prisoners 
and expressed the opinion of Victim Support on this issue which has publicly endorsed the 
view that prisoners should have the right to vote:  
 
Prisoners have committed a crime. Their punishment is to lose their liberty. That is fair and 
just. What is then gained by seeking to inflict civil death on them? In what way does that 
benefit the victim? ... The way we treat victims says a lot about the society that we strive to 
be, but the way we treat prisoners also says a lot about the society that we strive to be ... 
Interestingly, Victim Support, whose representatives I met a couple of weeks ago, is also of 
the view that prisoners should have the right to vote. I hope that Members will take that on 
board. (Tom Brake, Liberal Democrat: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, cols 543–5, 10 
February 2011) 
 
However, such reasoning was largely marginalised by the dominance of ‘victims before 
offenders’ themes.  The issues at stake when disenfranchising prisoners were neither debated 
nor thoroughly considered1 and, rather than discussing seriously the question of compensation 
to which prisoners may be entitled should the denial of their right to vote persist, debate, 
instead, reverted back to questions about victim compensation: 
 
We have to make it clear that we are not prepared to allow compensation. However, if these 
people do manage … to claim compensation, would it be beyond the wit of the House to help 
their victims and families to claim part of that new-found wealth as part of the compensation 
for the distress that they have suffered? (Steve McCabe, Labour: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 
523, cols 542–3, 10 February 2011) 
 
We should take the very simple step of amending the Limitation Act 1980, so that anybody 
who receives damages arising from litigation on this subject can have the damages taken 
away by the victims of their crime. (Simon Reevell, Conservative: Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 
523, col. 555, 10 February 2011) 
 
In the above debate, there is a notable absence of consideration of the ways in which the 
foundations of the democratic system are being undermined by denying the vote to citizens 
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who have become imprisoned.  ‘Civil death’ is not a necessary condition of the practice of 
imprisonment.  Further, acquiescing to the demands of the majority in the interests of 
democratic governance has been persuasively argued against by Snacken (2010).  She states: 
‘[Populist punitiveness] is contrary to the concept of a “democratic constitutional state”, 
which aims at the general interest and protects the fundamental rights of minorities, including 
unpopular minorities such as offenders or prisoners, from the “tyranny of the majority”’ (de 
Toqueville 1835/1956, cited in Snacken 2010, p.280). Within debates on prisoners’ voting 
and human rights it is helpful to project ourselves into the position of subject rather than 
aligning ourselves with the majority on these issues.  As Zedner (2005) has pointed out: ‘… if 
rights make sense at all then the invasion of a strong right must be a very serious matter.  It 
means treating a man as less than a man or as less worthy of concern than other men’ (p.519). 
 Moreover, Uggen and Matza (2004) and Easton (2009) have argued that there is 
rehabilitative potential in the exercising of the vote in a democratic system.  In empirical 
analyses, Uggen and Matza (2004) revealed consistent differences in subsequent arrest rates, 
imprisonment and self-reported criminality between voters and non-voters (p.213).  It is 
possible, then, that the social inclusion of prisoners (and ex-prisoners) might be facilitated to 
some extent where their participation in democratic processes is encouraged, rather than 
barred.  On this, Easton (2009) has argued that whilst extending the vote to prisoners would 
not guarantee their substantive rights, it would go some way to centralising social inclusion as 
an essential element of citizenship 
The above arguments however, have received little serious consideration in public and 
political discourses.  In much of the media reporting on the rights of victims and the rights of 
prisoners, a frequently-touted argument is encapsulated in the question: where was the respect 
for the victim’s human rights when this crime was taking place?  Such a question confuses 
debates on human rights and who is protected from whom through the attendant legislation.  
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Becoming a victim of a violent crime at the hands of another member of society is not a 
human rights’ violation per se.  Human rights’ legislation and protections were put in place to 
protect us from overuses or abuses of authority by the State, not from each other.  It is 
difficult to follow a logic that suggests that the repeal of human rights’ legislation for 
prisoners or the disregard of their human rights’ protections will somehow create a fairer 
criminal justice system that better protects the interests of victims.  Human rights – that is 
protection from the State – should be extended equally to all members of society, no matter 
what their conduct or status.  As Snacken (2010) has argued:  
 
The protection of human rights is at the very core of the political construct of a democratic 
constitutional state … [Human rights] work as a shield or a bulwark to protect individuals 
against excessive steering of their lives and entitle individuals to determine freely and 
autonomously their lives and choices and to participate in the political system. (p.281, italics 
in original) 
 
 
The Construction of a False and Fruitless Dichotomy 
 
Debating questions about human rights’ legislation alongside questions about the rights to 
which victims and ‘offenders’ are entitled, obfuscates the problem of Britain’s compliance 
with human rights’ legislation and the treatment of both victims and perpetrators by the 
criminal justice system.  Positioning ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ in different citizenship 
categories produces an artificial delineation between citizens – all of whom are deserving of 
protection from abuse at the hands of the State (through human rights’ legislation), protection 
from each other (through criminal justice processes) and fair and equitable treatment when 
each comes into contact with the criminal justice system.   
Utilising the plight of victims within debates on human rights or on prisoners’ voting 
and, thereby, citizenship rights, is a troubling tactic.  First, such strategies indicate a tendency 
to stifle debate on the implications of human rights’ rulings whilst evading the proper scrutiny 
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of future criminal justice legislation.  This was evidenced in a coda to the debate on prisoner 
voting which occurred six days later after the government announced that it would be 
introducing a mechanism for review for those subject to indefinite inclusion on the UK ‘sex 
offenders register’.  This was prompted by a UK Supreme Court judgment in the case of R & 
Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2010] UKSC 17) ruling that 
lifetime inclusion on the register without the right of review was a violation of Article 8 of the 
Human Rights Act (the right to privacy and family life).  A statement by the Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, and the short debate which followed was, once again, pre-empted by comments 
made during Prime Minister’s questions:  
 
Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con.): After votes for prisoners, we now have the potential for 
human rights legislation to give sex offenders the opportunity to come off the sex offenders 
register. Is the Prime Minister aware that my constituents are sick to the back teeth of the 
human rights of criminals and prisoners being put before the rights of law-abiding citizens in 
this country?  Is it not time that we scrapped the Human Rights Act and, if necessary, 
withdrew from the European convention on human rights? 
 
The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend speaks for many people in saying how completely 
offensive it is, once again, to have a ruling by a court that flies in the face of common sense. 
Requiring serious sexual offenders to sign the register for life, as they now do, has broad 
support across this House and across the country. I am appalled by the Supreme Court ruling. 
We will take the minimum possible approach to this ruling. (Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 523, 
col. 955, 16 February 2011, italics added) 
 
In his critique of popular sociology, Gramsci (1971) posits that common sense is ‘the 
philosophy of non-philosophers’, ideas which are distinguished by their ‘fragmentary, 
incoherent and inconsequential’ character (p.419). Worrall (1990, pp.18–19) describes the 
goal of common sense as ‘the reproduction of consensus’, noting that: ‘It is truth which is not 
accessible to rational thought or argument.  On the contrary, it is intuitive, instinctive, and 
accessible only to the senses’.  In this context, Cameron’s statement can be viewed as not 
only relying upon long-standing notions of the ‘dangerous other’ (see Garland 2001) but also 
its appeal to populist sensibilities and ‘gut instinct’.2  The construction of a conflict between 
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‘offenders’’ human rights and those of crime victims was evident once again in later 
exchanges on the Supreme Court ruling between the Home Secretary and her Shadow: 
 
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May): … Those are rights, of 
course, that those offenders have taken away from their victims in the cruellest and most 
degrading manner possible … It is time to assert that it is Parliament that makes our laws, not 
the courts; that the rights of the public come before the rights of criminals …  
 
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab.): … the Home Secretary will 
know that the public would be horrified if the rights, or even the convenience, of people who 
have been convicted of very serious crimes were to be put above the right to safety and family 
life of the public and of vulnerable people and vulnerable victims. (Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 
523, cols 959–61, 16 February 2011) 
 
In both of the above exchanges, the continued confusion over the way human rights are 
understood and discussed in these debates is evident. As already stated, human rights’ 
legislation is not intended to protect citizens from each other.  It is intended to protect 
members of society from excessive State intervention.  If ‘constituents’ are raising concerns 
over the extent to which State bodies, such as the police or social services, effectively carry 
out their work to protect social members from each other, then that is quite another matter.  
Crucially, however, it is not a problem with human rights’ legislation.   
Second, the discourses utilised in these debates reinforce the enduring stigmatising 
effects of imprisonment through the creation of a false ‘victim or offender’ dichotomy.  
Evidence for a false dichotomy between victims’ and offenders’ rights can be found in 
research which highlights the interchangeable nature of victimisation and offending, 
particularly amongst women and younger offenders.  Corston (2007), in a review of 
vulnerable women in prison, found that over half reported having suffered domestic violence 
and one in three had experienced sexual abuse.  Douglas, Plugge and Fitzpatrick (2009), in a 
study of the impact of imprisonment on women’s health, found evidence suggesting that 
some women prisoners actually saw incarceration as an opportunity for respite from such 
victimisation (see also Rowe 2011). In relation to younger people, longitudinal studies have 
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found evidence for causal links (in both directions) between offending and victimisation in a 
cohort of 4,300 young people (Smith 2004; Smith and Ecob 2007).  Offending behaviour or 
experiences of victimisation are not fixed positions, yet current debates seem to crudely shape 
them as such.  Whilst political discourse encourages members of the public to show 
compassion towards victims and to see them as a vulnerable, but deserving group, it 
simultaneously castigates the actions of ‘offenders’ whilst carelessly ignoring the fact that 
many individuals might fall into both categories. 
Third, the rhetorical division between victims and lawbreakers may undermine 
opportunities for the successful reintegration of ex-prisoners back into society (see also the 
extensive work on the question of disenfranchisement in the US by Uggen and Manza (2002, 
2004, 2005)).  The recent implementation of the Prisoner’s Earnings Act 1996 provides a 
useful example.  A striking exception to calls for an end to ‘compensation culture’ can be 
found within Prison Service Instruction 48/2011 which allows for the deduction of a levy of 
40% of prisoners’ net earnings over £20 to be paid to the charity, Victim Support.  Critics of 
the ‘victims’ levy’ have claimed that it may well, in fact, be counterproductive and will 
hamper the resettlement of those who, in many cases, have not committed offences for many 
years (Harmsworth 2011).  Yet, support for the creation of such a policy can be clearly linked 
to statements such as those outlined in parliamentary debate.   
Finally, we suggest that the focus on punishing ‘offenders’ deflects attention from 
much-needed discussions of how the criminal justice system treats victims.  By arguing that 
victims’ rights can be won by removing rights from prisoners, there is little consideration 
given to how victims might be better supported.  And, as argued earlier in this article, there is 
no evidence or persuasive argument to support the view that the criminal justice system is in 
need of rebalancing in this way (Loader 2006).  Moreover, the removal of a ‘right’ from 
lawbreakers has been seen to foreshadow its removal or curtailment from all members of 
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society – including victims. In 2011, the government announced its desire to ban ‘convicted 
criminals’ from ‘claiming compensation for injuries sustained in attacks, in prison or after 
release’.  This policy related to payments from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
– a body established by the Home Office in 1995, which pays compensation to those 
physically or mentally injured as the result of violent crime.  Philip Davies, a back-bench 
Conservative MP, was unequivocal in his support for the proposal and was quoted as saying 
that: ‘It is an outrage and a scandal that so much taxpayers’ money is being wasted on 
compensating criminals, who most people would think lost the right to make these claims’ 
(Independent, 27 December 2011).  Similarly, a ‘senior source’ in the Ministry of Justice 
claimed that: ‘It is ridiculous that we are continuing to spend so much money on the injuries 
sustained by convicted criminals when so many victims of crime are still waiting for funds’  
(Independent, 27 December 2011). Yet what was interesting about this development is that 
within a year, the removal of compensation for criminal injuries from prisoners was being 
extended to all members of the public through a drastic scaling back of compensation to all 
but the ‘most seriously injured’ victims (Independent, 27 November 2012).   
 
Conclusion 
 
Human rights, prisoners voting rights, the rights of persons accused and convicted of criminal 
conduct, and the rights of victims of crime, are all central issues in contemporary political and 
criminal justice debates.  In much of the media coverage on prisoners’ voting rights and in 
political debate on this issue there is an apparent assumption that granting these rights will 
lead to widespread hostility amongst the general public and continued opposition within 
parliament.  Moreover, the apparent hostility within some public and political spheres toward 
human rights’ provision for accused persons, prisoners and ex-prisoners, adds a significant 
and obfuscating barrier when attempting to debate the questions about current approaches to 
crime control, criminal justice, and victim support.  Rational debate seems beyond the grasp 
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of political actors when the rights of victims and offenders are viewed in opposing categories.  
In this context, victims are not understood as a deserving group in their own right or in need 
of meaningful State-sponsored support.  The potential for improvements to victims’ services 
becomes lost in the battle of offenders’ versus victims’ rights with neither group benefiting 
substantially, and indeed, in the wake of the conflict, the social status of prisoners becomes 
even more marginal.  In Britain, prisoners and ex-prisoners become ‘others’, in not just 
rhetorical, but material, terms.  Their criminal records that follow them out into society after 
release contribute significantly to their continued social exclusion and feelings of 
stigmatisation (Social Exclusion Unit 2002; Unlock 2009; Working Links 2010; Aresti, 
Eatough and Brooks-Gordon 2010; Nacro 2010; see also Pager (2007) in the US).  Yet the 
denial of their voting rights in custody makes their continued exclusion even more likely and 
serves only to exacerbate their sense of detachment from active citizenship. Their construction 
as ‘expelled citizens’ (or rather reconstruction as ‘denizens’ or even ‘social outcasts’) are 
likely to retain much more salience than any sense of ‘social belonging’ or inclusiveness.     
One means by which those who have contravened the law might become more 
committed to democratic values and social responsibility is through exercising their political 
rights through voting.  By the State not recognising these rights, successful reintegration back 
into society after imprisonment is further hindered.  As van Zyl Smit and Snacken (2009) have 
argued: ‘… to strip prisoners of their most basic rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote, 
will isolate them from their communities and threaten their capacity to establish or maintain 
successful adult roles, which are important in the process of desisting from crime’ (p.254).  
Desistance research has considered the potential of civil reintegration ceremonies and 
processes of ‘judicial rehabilitation’ where courts can ‘wipe the record clean’ for individuals 
as a means of destigmatisation (Maruna 2011; Padfield 2011; see also Earle and Wakefield 
(2012) on the need to ‘deinstitutionalise’ the stigma of criminal records).  However, given the 
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prevalence of the ‘anti-offender’ political rhetoric outlined in this article (which seems to be 
continuing unabated), it is unlikely that such progressive ideas will achieve recognition any 
time soon.  That is, perhaps, until they are more effectively constructed in a way that 
demonstrates their benefit to the potential future victims of recidivist crime, thus making them 
a more palatable option for politicians and the public alike.3 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The continued disregard of its commitment to the ECHR by the UK government is a theme 
which re-emerged in a more recent debate on the issue of Abu Qatada’s (non-)deportation 
(see Hansard, HC Debates, vol. 561, cols 887–900, 24 April 2013). 
2 Professor Vernon Bogdanor, who was David Cameron’s politics tutor at Oxford University 
once made the following comments in response to his former students’ claim that a ‘British 
Bill of Rights’ was required to replace the Human Rights Act: ‘I think he is very confused. 
I've read his speech and it's filled with contradictions. There are one or two good things in it 
but one glimpses them, as it were, through a mist of misunderstanding’ (Guardian, 1 July 
2006).  
3 Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments 
and suggestions of additions to this article.   
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